Gene expression profiling is a sophisticated method to discover differences in activation patterns of genes between different patient collectives. By reasonably defining patient groups from a medical point of view, subsequent gene expression analysis may reveal disease-related gene expression patterns that are applicable for tumor markers and pharmacological target identification. When releasing patient-specific data for medical studies privacy protection has to be guaranteed for ethical and legal reasons. k-anonymisation may be used to generate a sufficient number of k data twins in order to ensure that sensitive data used in analyses is protected from being linked to individuals. We use an adapted concept of k-anonymity for distributed data sources and include various customisation parameters in the anonymisation process to guarantee that the transformed data is still applicable for further processing. We present a real-world medical-relevant use case and show how the related data is materialised, anonymised, and released in a data mart for testing the related hypotheses.
Introduction
Gene expression profiling is a sophisticated method to discover differences in activation patterns of genes between healthy and diseased cells and tissues. Molecular signatures that correlate with diseases may be unveiled and used for prognoses. In cancer research tumour markers are derived from reliable classification patterns of gene expressions. Further, previously unknown subtypes of cancers may be detected. To support both gene expression analysis and data release for clinical studies we developed a virtual data warehouse solution where patient collectives are selectable and gene expression profiles are linked for further analysis. Patient data (from clinical databases) and gene expression data is integrated and materialised on demand in a data mart. Subsequent analyses may be used to detect connections (correlations) between patient related data (personal data, history, lifestyle data, clinical analysis data) and patterns in gene expression profiles.
When releasing patient-specific data for medical studies privacy protection has to be guaranteed for ethical and legal reasons. Even when immediately identifying attributes like name, address or day of birth are eliminated, other attributes (quasi-identifying) may be used to link the released data with external data to re-identify individuals. The concept of k-anonymity requires that each distinct combination of quasi-identifying attributes occurs at least k times in a shared table. [PS98] . Hence, a sufficient number of k data twins is used to mantle the individuality of persons. The number of data twins may be increased by transforming attribute values to more general ones using predefined generalisation hierarchies or by simply suppressing attributes.
Several methods for achieving k-anonymity have been developed. Generally, we can distinguish between approaches using global recoding [WYC04, LDR05, FWY05] of attribute values, those using constrained local recoding [LDR06] and those using full local recoding ([XWP + 06]). Global recoding of attribute values may be defined as a set of functions that transform attribute values to generalised or altered values. In a single-dimensional global recoding all values of a certain attribute domain are mapped to transformed values, while multidimensional global recoding (also considered as constrained local recoding) recode combinations of attribute domains. Full local recoding is used to recode non-distinctive attribute values, that is, two tuples with equivalent attribute values may be recoded differently. We are using fulldomain generalisation which is a kind of single-dimensional global recoding. Each attribute is generalised independently from all the other attributes. Further, full-domain generalisation guarantees that every attribute value belongs to the same generalised domain [LDR05] . We prefer full-domain generalisations since the recoded data is useful for the context of our application. The transformed records are released to medical studies that investigate correlations between attributes, classify diseases in subtypes and make survival analyses of different courses of diseases. All those analyses need data transformed to equal generalisation levels. If the values for disease free survival are recoded to arbitrary intervals (e.g.: [0-5], [10-20] months) or not coded at all, a postprocessing of records is required. Additionally, after anonymisation any record may be easily transformed to a more general value but can not be recoded in a more specific one. Thus, in comparative analysis, all attribute values would have to be transformed up to the generalisation level of the most general one.
Following the concept of k-anonymity the anonymity of patients may be preserved by generalising and/or suppressing attribute values in order to generate data twins in the released data. Our data integration and anonymisation concepts have been developed in the context of the Austrian Genome Programme GEN-AU [iA] and as preliminary work for the biobank initiative of the Medical University Graz [BIO] . In this paper we extend our anonymisation algorithm [SEZ06] in order to guarantee k-anonymity in a shared table that is built from a set of data sources. We prevent that none of the shared table records may be used to reidentify individuals by generating data twins for each data source separately. Instead of allowing access to the entire shared data we release data as the result of data requests. Users are able to select a subset of the shared table they want to use in further analysis by defining projection and selection criteria.
Generalisation of attribute values is always related with an information loss. Though, the acceptable information loss may differ as the case arises. Some attributes should be generalised as little as possible while others may be transformed to more general values. For instance, in some medical study it's sufficient to know the age of patients in steps of five (40-45, 46-50,..) but the size of tumours is to be specified as detailed as possible. Hence, we allow the users to weight the importance of attributes for a specific data request by defining priorities and generalisation limits. Those criteria are considered in the anonymisation process and have a strong impact on the quality of the transformed data.
Further, we take into account different information losses in generalisation hierarchies. We therefore attempt to integrate knowledge of medical domain experts by allowing them to assess the information loss within each attribute hierarchy. Medical experts assign information loss quantifiers to each level of a generalisatin hierarchy in order to estimate the data quality decrease for each transformation step. A more detailed description of different information losses is given in section 4.2.
The paper is structured as follows: We describe the type of privacy protection we concentrate on in section 2. Section 3 describes the data sources that are available at the Medical University Graz and are integrated in a shared table. The process of anonymisation is specified in section 4. Finally, a detailed example use case from the medical research domain is presented in section 5.
General threat scenario
The original work of Samarati [PS98] focuses on the reidentifaction risk of linking released private data with publicly available information (i.e. city's voter list). However, privacy protection through k-anonymity is also applicable to shared data that result from data integration of multiple parties. In the work of [WFD05] two parties share data to benefit from a common classification analysis. Since the data sources remain separated, until an integrated table is built and common identifying attributes are used to link the two sources, those attributes could be used to learn attribute values of the other party. Thus, the set of quasi-identifying attributes is extended to all shared attributes of both parties. However, in our approach a trusted third party is responsible for linking records from all data sources and eliminating identifying attributes in the released data. Each data source has its own set of quasi-identifying attributes which corresponds to the set of attributes that is shared globally.
In our scenario a few parties share their private data in a publicly available table. Each party performs analyses on the global table but no party is able to deduce additional infomation related to its stored individuals. In Fig.1 three parties A, B, C are sharing a set of attributes in an integrated table. Each party has identifying keys for the individuals that are not shared globally. Any party may access the shared table, execute queries and use the result sets for further analysis. Though, it should not be possible to infer the identity of individuals by matching the global result set with the local data source. Further, if any external intruder gains access to the global table and to any local source he is not able to link all shared attributes to one individual. Therefore, we impose the k-anonymity constraint on each data source separately. Any globally shared record has to have k data twins in every data source. If we want to provide k-anonymity of k=3 in our example each tuple
Consider the following example: pathological findings, survival data and clinical data is integrated in a shared table (table 1) . Although no immediately identifying attributes are shared, distinct attribute value combinations may be used to reidentify individuals in the local sources. We examine for every data source whether there exist data twins for the shared attributes. In our case records 1, 2, 5 and 6 have no data twin for attributes PT, PN and PM. Further, records 3 and 6 have unique values for cause of death and all records do not have any data twin for (ν 1 , . ., ν n ) and has an associated cardinality c i counting the number of its elements. Equivalence classes are needed to check the k-anonymity constraint for a certain attribute value combination. Further details are given in section 4.5. Attribute values are transformed to more general values to increase the number of data twins. Each attribute has an associated generalisation hierarchy used for recoding. We distinguish between a dimension hierarchy and a member hierarchy [SEZ06] . While the member hierarchy is used to transform record values to generalised values, the dimension hierarchy is used for evaluation of generalisation steps.
Dimension hierarchy and member hierarchy
A dimensional hierarchy is composed of generalisation levels. Let the lowest generalisation level be L 0 , at that level all attribute values remain unchanged. Let L max be the maximal generalisation level for a certain α i . At this level, all values of an attribute α i are combined to a single generalised value. The highest generalisation level corresponds to the suppression of the attribute. Generalsations are always associated with an information loss, since an attribute value is transformed to a less specific value. While the dimensional hierarchy measures the information loss, the member hierarchy models the transformation from specific values to generalised values for each attribute. Each attribute α i (α i ∈ QI) takes its values from a certain domain, whereas an attribute domain may be nominal, ordinal or numeric. Attributes with nominal or ordinal data types are typically generalised using a generalisation hierarchy of parent-child re-
Information loss
By applying a sequence of consecutive generalisation steps, the information loss is accumulated. However, the data quality decrease is not necessarily equal for each generalisation step along the hierarchy. 
VALUES
AGGREGATED VALUE 1mic, 1a, 1b, 1c By applying two generalisation steps value classification 1a is transformed into [1 − 2]. Staging PT is determined by the size of the primary tumour. While for instance in breast cancer, tumours with a greatest dimension of 2 cm are classified as T1, tumours with a greatest dimension of minimal 2 and maximal 5 cm are classified as T2. Thus, transformation from (1mic, 1a, 1b, 1c) → 1 is of different quality than transformation (1, 2) → [1 − 2], since the difference among the subclassifications 1mic, 1a, 1b and 1c is smaller than the one among the classifications 1 and 2. We allow to specify customised information loss quantifiers along the generalisation hierarchy. The information loss is 0 at L 0 and 1 at L max . Information loss quantifiers ϕ (j) are assigned to all intermediate generalisation levels L j , 0 < j < max. A dimension hierarchy for attribute α i is denoted as set of edges, whereas an edge models the information loss up to generalisation
Priorities and Limits
Priorities are used to specify the relative importance for attributes and their granularity. In some cases exact values for a specific attribute may be favoured while the generalisation degree of others is negligible. Attributes with lower priorities are generalised first while attributes with higher priorities are only generalised when no other solution may be found. In some cases, attributes should be generalised only up to a certain degree or not transformed at all. Otherwise, their values become useless for an application domain. Therefore, it's crucial to allow definition of limits for information loss, someone is willing to cope with.
Request
For a particular analysis, a request is made on the shared If it is not possible to achieve the specified anonymity, no data will be released.
Anonymisation steps
Our algorithm attempts to find an appropriate anonymisation for a specific data request. The goal is to find a solution that is as close to data quality demands as possible. Thus, a depthfirst search looks for a solution along the top-ranked search path. We want to emphasize that alternative solutions could be found by backtracking and ranking of alternative paths. For simplicity, we focus on the search along the top-ranked path in this work. Before starting with anonymisation the data request is examined. Since k-anonymity is to be accomplished in each source table T j separately, anonymisation is composed of subsolutions for every data source. If a source table has none of the projected attributes, anonymisation is trivially fulfilled. The following three steps are executed for every involved data source.
Preprocessing:
A data source T j is sharing attribute set AS j . We filter all projection and selection criteria of request R = (Π A , σ (α i op cri) * ) that are related to attributes of T j . Hence, we deduce the following subrequest
We apply the filtered projection and selection criteria immediately on the shared table and retrieve a result set of tuples RS. For each distinct value combination of RS, an equivalence class [class j ] with associated cardinality c j is created. Finally, we store those equivalence classes in set T Anon .
Initialisation of algorithm:
Selection criteria do have to be considered in the anonymisation process. Any selection criteria limits the generalisation potential of an attribute. Consider the following example: A set of patients having colon cancer that is staged up to 1 should be released. The localisation (colon) has been specified exactly, that is, it cannot be generalised any further, since the requesting users knows the exact value. Staging 1 is a generalised value of (1a, 1b, 1c, 1mic). Hence, staging t is generalisable up to value 1. Selection criteria may determine the maximal limits of generalisations. If a user-defined limit and a selection criteria limit is specified for the same attribute the smaller one is taken.
T Anon by replacing all attribute values of α g with generalised values. In the next processing step, merge(T Anon ), a new equivalence class set is created by grouping distinct attribute values of T Anon to equivalence classes. If each equivalence class has at least an associated cardinality of k, a solution has been found and the sequence of necessary generalisation steps is returned.
Release of records:
After the required generalisation steps have been determined for each source table, releasing of records may be initiated. We apply the projection and selection criteria on the shared table and transform the result set according to the generalisation steps.
Use Case
We have tested the following use case on pathological findings of the Institute of Pathology Graz. We focused on a staged mamma carcinoma data set of 16,417 cases. . Hence, the estimated information loss is smaller in the former case than in the latter. We estimate the information loss for attribute PT between level L 0 and L 1 with 30 %. Attributes R and PM are not generalisable hierarchically, but they may be suppressed.
Attribute Hierarchies

Detailed example use case
Although tumours may be staged identically, they may show different behaviour in the following course of disease. We want to analyse gene expression profiles of mamma carcinoma of size 1 (staging PT) having a well-differentiated grading (G=1). Additionally, the survival periods should be exported to allow further grouping. Altogether, the following attributes are needed: PT, PN, PM, G, R from findings table, survival period in days from survival data and finally the corresponding gene expression profiles of the selected cases should be linked. We may derive the following request from the textual description: 
Initialisation of algorithm:
Three attributes (Localisation, PT, G) have been used in selection criteria. Localisation is not generalisable, since 'Mamma' is not a generalised value, as well as grading value 1. Staging PT may be generalised up to generalised value '1'. The attribute priorities are specified as follows: R → 0.20, PM → 0.40, PN → 0.60, PT → 0.80. Further, a minimal k-anonymity of 2 is to be achieved.
Anonymisation of records:
We calculate the weighted information loss for each generalisable attribute when being transformed to its next generalisation level. It is 0.20 (= 0.20 * 1.0) for R , 0.24 (= 0.80 * 0.3) for PT, 0.30 (= 0.60 * 0.5) for PN and 0.40 (= 0.40 * 1.0) for PM. Attribute R is chosen to be generalised (GS 1 = (R, 1)). As R values are only generalisable up to a general all value (*), the attribute is suppressed. The resulting new set of equivalence classes has 98 members and 48 classes have a cardinality of 1. In the next anonymisation step attribute PT is selected and all PT values are generalised (GS 2 = (T, 1)). We retrieve a set of 16 equivalence classes, whereas each class has a cardinality greater than 1.
Release of records:
Finally we apply the selection and projection criteria on the shared table, execute generalisation steps GS 1 and GS 2 on the result set, and release the anonymised data together with the related gene expression profiles and survival periods.
Through these four steps, the data stemming from different sources of our virtual data warehouse have been integrated, anonymised and are released to the requester in form of a data mart. The users now can perform analytical queries or data mining procedures on this data mart, or use the table as input to statistical tools. Tracking down the the released data to an individual person is not possible through this method.
Impact of parameters
The result set produced by the algorithm is strongly influenced by the parameters the user specified. Thus, different data quality demands of medical studies may be considered. If the input parameters (priorities and limits) of our use case example are changed a different anonymisation is created. In table 8 a summary of the input and output parameters of the original use case settings is given. Attribute R is suppressed, attribute PT is generalised up to generalisation level 1 and the transformed result set contains 16 equivalence classes satisfying the k-anonymity constraint of 2. If the priorities and limits are changed as shown in 
Conclusion
We presented an approach for flexible anonymisation of shared data stemming from different sources with the aim of minimizing information loss and maximizing use of data for research without compromising the privacy of patients. The major contribution of this approach is the individualzation of the concept of an information loss, when data are generalised. This allows at least the attempt to provide the data of main interest for a particular analysis in great detail while achieving the deired anonymity by sacrificing other granularity of the values of other attributes. We demonstrated the effectiveness of the approach in a use case, applying the algorithm to real world data. Various ways of improving the technical implementation of our strategy as well as an exhaustive evaluation of the performance of the algorithm are subject of ongoing work.
